I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances";... And I shall say: 'games' form a family. 1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1953 Even at the ordinary-language level, it is strange to say that all games "have something in common," namely, being games. For some games involve winning and losing, others ("Ring a Ring o'Roses") do not; some games are played for the amusement of the players, others (gladatorial games) are not; some games have more than one player, others do not; and so on. In the same way, when we examine closely all the cases in which we would say that someone has "referred to" something...., we do not find any one relation between the word and the thing referred to. 2 Hilary Putnam, 1988 The doctrine of family resemblances is tied in a peculiar way to the particular example of games. For although the doctrine has become part of the arsenal of analytic philosophy, on the occasions when philosophers feel a need to support it, the example of games is what is supposed to clinch the matter. No one gives Wittgenstein's second example, numbers, probably because it is so unpersuasive. Other examples that philosophers sometimes proffer, for instance, "party," "spot," "train," seem easy enough to define and too slight to matter. More weighty and interesting examples, for instance, "religion," "justice," "reference," are controversial, for there are theories purporting to explain what all just acts or societies, say, have in common; and even if we are unsatisfied with such theories, there remains a real possibility that we may find the true account if we look further.
Hence philosophically interesting examples will persuade only if
we have already accepted the doctrine of family resemblances on other grounds. As a matter of historical fact, the argument for the doctrine has gone:
The word "game" cannot be defined by a common feature of games, for obviously there is none. We call something a "game" because of its relationship with several things we have called games; we extend our concept along these various resemblances "as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre," with no fibre running through its whole length.
3 This is what explains our concept "game"and, probably, a host of other philosophically interesting terms, e.g., "number," "reference," "religion," and so on.
A good way to cast serious doubt on the doctrine, consequently,
is to say what is common to games. After all, if the doctrine fails for its most impressive and persuasive example, why believe it? Wittgenstein would owe us new arguments, at the least. That is what I propose to do in this paper.
Wittgenstein's injunction, "Don't think, but look!" is an invitation to miss the forest for the trees. Of course, if you look at games without thinking "you will not see something common to them all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that." Let's disobey the fatal injunction, and look and think both. A promising place to seek the essence of games is within the class of rule-defined activities, that is, activities it would be impossible to perform without following rules. 4 Hence the rule defining success is an arbitrary addition in that we could have adopted, consistent with all the other rules, a different definition of success.
Consider the child throwing a ball against a wall and catching it again. Where this activity is a game, the child is following a rule like: "Throw the ball against the wall and catch it, where success is catching the ball you've thrown against the wall." 6 A feature of many children's games is that the activity which is the playing of the game is also what is defined by the rule as succeeding. As the activity is usually easy so is performing it successfully, one of the reasons such games provide so much pleasure for children and so little for adults. The rule for Ring around O' Roses is: "You and your colleagues hold hands and run in a circle chanting 'Ring a round o' Roses.... All fall down'; and all fall down roughly when you sing "All fall down', which is succeeding." Where the very activity that constitutes the game is defined as succeeding, there is success but no winning. Note, however, that in each case we could have adopted different definitions of success consistent with the remaining rules, e.g., "Success is catching the ball twenty times in a row" in the first case, and "Success is being the first (or second, or last) player to reach the ground" in the second. ease, and beauty. And I submit it is just obvious that beautiful waltzing isn't successful because a rule says it is. The dance is a kind of raw material which is used as a medium to realize aesthetic features, in much the way that clay is sculpted to manifest such properties. It is because we value grace and beauty that we create various mediums for their realization. Beauty is success in waltzing because we strive for beauty; we do not strive for beauty because it is defined as success by a rule.
(Contrast a straight line of markers in Bingo.) Of course, we could adopt such a rule, in which case waltzing would be a game, as in (heaven forbid!) a waltzing contest.
Wittgenstein writes:
But if someone wished to say: "There is something common to all these constructions--namely the disjunction of all their common properties"--I should reply: Now you are only playing with words. You might as well say: "Something runs through the whole thread--namely the continuous overlapping of those fibres".
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But a game, on our account, is typically played for the recreation of participants or spectators or to sharpen skills.
Isn't this the sort of disjunctive definition Wittgenstein explicitly rejects? Well, no. First, all games must share the feature of being rule-defined activities involving a state that counts as performing the activity successfully because an arbitrary rule so defines it. Plainly Wittgenstein has in mind a more radical disjunction, where there is no important commonality and games share only the disjunction of different properties.
Second, the disjuncts themselves have something in common, namely, they reflect the fact that success in games is created by an arbitrary rule. We do not typically play a game because we consider its success state intrinsically valuable, nor do we play it because its success state has pre-existing causal connections to other states we value. We create a rule-defined success state and pursue it, not because it has intrinsic value or pre-existing instrumental value, but because we value the pursuit. 5. Jonathan Bennett tells me (in correspondence) that he has defined "game" jokingly as "x is a game"= "x is not a physical object and x can be played." Professor Bennett, who informs me that he got this "definition" from Ian Hacking twenty-five years ago, uses it to show that there is more to analyzing something than finding a conjunction that is strictly equivalent to it.
6. There are plenty of recreational activities that are merely pleasant pastimes, not games, e.g., playing with a yo-yo. Here there is no state that counts as success because rules define it.
Either we simply enjoy performing the activity, e.g, throwing a football back and forth, or we are trying to do tricks and feats (with the yo-yo, say, or balancing a stick on one's nose) which count as success because we are trying to do them. If a child is bouncing a ball against the wall and catching it simply because he finds the activity pleasant, in exactly the way we find throwing a football back and forth pleasant, he is not playing a game. 11. This is so even if success is defined by the rules as managing to perform the activity, as in Ring around O' Roses.
12. Of course, there is the question of whether waltzing is really rule-defined--a trained bear might waltz, but is she following a rule? Let's err on the side of the objection and set this aside.
13. Wittgenstein, 67.
14. Of course, we would probably remark that chess is like a game.
15. See this author, "A Theory of Religion" in Religious Studies, 27, pp. 337-351.
16. My thanks to Judith Crane and Norton Nelkin for helpful discussions and comments.
